|
|
| Line 33: |
Line 33: |
|
| |
|
| With a quotation from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_philosophy: | | With a quotation from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_philosophy: |
| "
| |
| In [[philosophy]], the '''embodied mind thesis''' holds that the nature of the human [[mind]] is largely determined by the form of the human body.
| |
| [[Philosopher]]s, [[psychology|psychologist]]s, [[cognitive science|cognitive scientist]]s and [[artificial intelligence|artificial intelligence researcher]]s who study '''embodied cognition''' and the '''embodied mind''' argue that all aspects of cognition are shaped by aspects of the body. The aspects of cognition include high level mental constructs (such as [[concept]]s and [[category|categories]]) and human performance on various cognitive tasks (such as reasoning or judgement). The aspects of the body include the [[motor system]], the [[perceptual system]], the body's interactions with the environment ([[situated]]ness) and the [[ontological]] assumptions about the world that are built into the body and the brain.
| |
|
| |
| The embodied mind thesis is opposed to other theories of [[cognition]] such as [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivism]], [[computationalism]] and [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Cartesian dualism]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Varela|Thompson|Rosch|1992}}</ref> The idea has roots in [[Kant]] and [[continental philosophy|20th century continental philosophy]] (such as [[Merleau-Ponty]]). The modern version depends on insights drawn from recent research in [[psychology]], [[linguistics]], [[cognitive science]], [[Cognitive model#Dynamical Systems | dynamical systems]], [[artificial intelligence]], [[robotics]] and [[neurobiology]].
| |
|
| |
| Embodied cognition is a topic of research in [[social psychology|social]] and [[cognitive psychology]], covering issues such as [[social interaction]] and [[decision-making]].<ref name="Borghi & Cimatti">{{cite journal|last=Borghi|first=A. M.|coauthors=Cimatti, F.|title=Embodied cognition and beyond: Acting and sensing the body|journal=Neuropsychologia|year=2010|volume=48|pages=763–773|doi=10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.029|issue=3|pmid=19913041|ref=harv}}</ref> Embodied cognition reflects the argument that the [[motor system]] influences our cognition, just as the mind influences bodily actions. For example, when participants hold a pencil in their teeth engaging the muscles of a smile, they comprehend pleasant sentences faster than unpleasant ones.<ref name="Glenberg et al.">{{cite journal|last=Glenberg|first=A.|coauthors=Havas, D.; Becker, R.; & Rinck, M.|title=Grounding language in bodily states: the case for emotion|year=2010|ref=harv}}</ref> And it works in reverse: holding a pencil in their teeth to engage the muscles of a frown increases the time it takes to comprehend pleasant sentences.<ref name="Glenberg et al." />
| |
|
| |
| [[George Lakoff]] (a [[cognitive scientist]] and [[linguistics|linguist]]) and his collaborators (including [[Mark Johnson (professor)|Mark Johnson]], [[Mark Turner (cognitive scientist)|Mark Turner]], and [[Rafael E. Núñez]]) have written a series of books promoting and expanding the thesis based on discoveries in [[cognitive science]], such as [[conceptual metaphor]] and [[image schema]].<ref>{{Harvtxt|Lakoff|Johnson|1980}}; {{Harvtxt|Lakoff|1987}}; {{Harvtxt|Lakoff|Turner|1989}}; {{Harvtxt|Lakoff|Johnson|1999}}; {{Harvnb|Lakoff|Nunez|2000}}</ref>
| |
|
| |
| [[Robotic]]s researchers such as [[Rodney Brooks]], [[Hans Moravec]] and [[Rolf Pfeifer]] have argued that true [[artificial intelligence]] can only be achieved by machines that have [[Sensory perception|sensory]] and [[motor skills]] and are connected to the world through a body.<ref>{{Harvnb|Moravec|1988}}, {{Harvnb|Brooks|1990}}, {{Harvnb|Pfeiffer|2001}}</ref> The insights of these robotics researchers have in turn inspired philosophers like [[Andy Clark]] and [[Horst Hendriks-Jansen]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Clark|1997}}, {{Harvnb|Hendriks-Jansen|1996}}</ref>
| |
|
| |
| [[Neurobiology|Neuroscientist]]s [[Gerald Edelman]], [[António Damásio]] and others have outlined the connection between the body, individual structures in the brain and aspects of the mind such as [[consciousness]], [[emotion]], [[self-awareness]] and [[Will (philosophy)|will]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Edelman|2004}}, {{Harvnb|Damasio|1999}}</ref> [[Biology]] has also inspired [[Gregory Bateson]], [[Humberto Maturana]], [[Francisco Varela]], [[Eleanor Rosch]] and [[Evan Thompson]] to develop a closely related version of the idea, which they call [[enactivism]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Maturana|Varela|1987}}, {{Harvnb|Varela|Thompson|Rosch|1992}}</ref> The [[motor theory of speech perception]] proposed by [[Alvin Liberman]] and colleagues at the [[Haskins Laboratories]] argues that the identification of words is embodied in perception of the bodily movements by which spoken words are made.<ref name="Liberman67">{{cite journal|pmid=4170865|year=1967|last1=Liberman|first1=AM|last2=Cooper|first2=FS|last3=Shankweiler|first3=DP|last4=Studdert-Kennedy|first4=M|title=Perception of the speech code|volume=74|issue=6|pages=431–61|journal=Psychological review|ref=harv|doi=10.1037/h0020279}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|pmid=4075760|year=1985|last1=Liberman|first1=AM|last2=Mattingly|first2=IG|title=The motor theory of speech perception revised|volume=21|issue=1|pages=1–36|journal=Cognition|ref=harv|doi=10.1016/0010-0277(85)90021-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|pmid=|2643163|year=1989|last1=Liberman|first1=AM|last2=Mattingly|first2=IG|title=A specialization for speech perception|volume=243|issue=4890|pages=489–94|journal=Science|ref=harv}}</ref><ref name="Liberman00">{{cite journal|pmid=10782105|year=2000|last1=Liberman|first1=AM|last2=Whalen|first2=DH|title=On the relation of speech to language|volume=4|issue=5|pages=187–196|journal=Trends in cognitive sciences|ref=harv|doi=10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01471-6}}</ref><ref name="Galantucci">{{cite journal|pmid=17048719|year=2006|last1=Galantucci|first1=B|last2=Fowler|first2=CA|last3=Turvey|first3=MT|title=The motor theory of speech perception reviewed|volume=13|issue=3|pages=361–77|pmc=2746041|journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review|ref=harv}}</ref>
| |
| "
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
Revision as of 19:13, 24 July 2012
This is a property of type Selflance.
This text will be the reflection of an attempt to formulate a term as selflance.
As it is "they are" with self and lance, "selflance" itself should be out of in/for statements of self, in addition to the manner of the "lance" that can be related to the term of lense from the point of its visuality.
Surveillance from the point of its multidimensions for today, is already a disciplinary subject. And maybe evaluated back a social hegemony management model "for itself" on "in itself". Surely this seems conflictional and paradigmatic, and that is also the general manner for the concşusions in this era. In a simple case of this sens, while there are tendencies or critiques on the subjects of surveillance by some technologies, there have been also tendencies and researches to formulate the education or learning values and approaches for the same technologies that next generations should be able to adapt and manage it for their future.
These are also where generation is with problems for their own ( self development.) -but is it necessary?-
Which is referance for their own self?
User name with password as its extention, ironically, or contents contributed/evaluated by them?
It looks as level stages, because possible answers may change in terms of accessible permissions, as guest user, member, moderator, admin, cpanel manager, even domain, or server owner/renter, also with all possible user types by admins.
Rather then the clarifiation of these level stratifications, their being as validitor of referance for identity of self, seems essential and operational.
And I will attempt to interpellate this scene as unity of "self" with "lance" to construct "selflance".
-
So what? -this is for my other page types.-
Selflance .. that looks as a "whitepaper" irony against density of determined conditions. But not so much. Because "hisenbergian undeterminancy should protect against it. Hence the remaining risk becomes the duality of body-mind priority. At the end it comes the question of cognitive paradigmes as if holistic or constructivist or augmantic or reflective and so on etc.
The general discussions waves the clarifications of this duality between mind and body. And even holistic approach itself tries to overcome it within the unification of both.
But is it? And any refernce of the results for these paradigmes will be the criteria for new generations adaptability. That also makes the validity of mind-body model of that generation a well.
With a quotation from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_philosophy:
tags: all for role, base, user, value, differs to selfish, reflective theories, walking types in mirror forest.
The allowed value for this property is: